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Abstract
One of the consequences of the euro changeover in 2002 was that for a
period of several years people considerably overestimated actual inﬂation.
The goal of this paper is to study whether misperceptions of this kind
may have real eﬀects, that is, whether they induce people to alter their
behaviour. We also discuss the question how far the euro changeover and
the ensuing discussion about price stability contributed to the recession
that followed the changeover. Looking at the German restaurant sector,
we ﬁnd that people’s misperceptions can have signiﬁcant negative eﬀects.
The contraction this sector experienced in the months after the changeover
was too pronounced to be explained by normal business cycle movements.
We provide a discussion about the causes of these misperceptions and how
to avoid them in future changeovers.
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1 Introduction
One of the consequences of the euro changeover in 2002 was that for a period
of several years people considerably overestimated actual inﬂation rates. This
paper studies whether misperceptions of this kind may have real eﬀects and tries
to shed some light on the question how far the euro changeover and the ensuing
discussion about price stability contributed to the recession that followed the
changeover.
∗University of Heidelberg (eife@uni-hd.de) and UniCredit Group
(stephan.maier@unicreditgroup.eu). The paper does not necessarily reﬂect the views of
UniCredit Group.
1The possibility that inﬂation misperceptions may have real eﬀects has been
discussed before (e.g. Bundesbank 2003 and Corsetti 2007), but we are not
aware of a paper that estimates the eﬀect of these misperceptions on real eco-
nomic activity as we attempt here. In this paper we will restrict ourselves to
the German restaurant industry, an industry that contracted signiﬁcantly after
the changeover and returned to its pre-changeover growth levels only two years
later. We will argue that this contraction cannot be explained by normal busi-
ness cycle movements and that the decline in economic activity was caused by
people’s misperceptions.
The decline in economic activity appears to be driven by two factors. First,
many consumers were confused by the alleged price increases and reduced con-
sumption; in some cases apparently to “punish” retailers. The consumer strikes
organized in countries like Italy or Germany in summer 2002, several months
after the changeover, illustrate this behaviour. Second, the changeover and the
discussion about price stability appear to have had a profound negative impact
on consumer conﬁdence and on people’s perceptions of their own ﬁnancial situ-
ation. Both factors aﬀect consumption not only in the restaurant sector so that
even if this study focuses on one sector, the underlying mechanisms that lead
to the real eﬀects are more general.
A diﬃculty with the exercise of estimating how misperceptions aﬀect actual
behaviour is that it requires some information about how people would have
behaved without them. It is for this diﬃculty that we have chosen to focus
on the restaurant sector. People complained especially about prices of services
such as hairdressing, restaurants or dry cleaning and if misperceptions have any
real eﬀects, it is likely to observe them in the services sector. Furthermore, it
may often be easier to reduce the consumption of services than of many other
items. For the German restaurant sector we were able to get monthly data for
a period of more than 25 years so that we are fairly conﬁdent when claiming
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Figure 1    Restaurant Revenue and the Changeover
Figure 1 depicts revenue growth of the German restaurant industry from
1995 until 2006. Note that the contraction we mentioned before was gradual.
It started with the changeover but reached its peak only about a year later.
After two or three years the growth rates appear to have returned to their pre-
changeover level. The ﬁgure also shows growth as predicted by the model of
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Figure 2    Actual and Perceived Inflation
Figure 2 shows actual inﬂation and a measure of perceived inﬂation in Ger-
many from 1995 until 2006. The data on perceived inﬂation are constructed
using survey data from the Consumer Conﬁdence Barometer of the European
Commission.1 Perceived inﬂation follows actual inﬂation relatively closely but
both series start to diverge when the euro was introduced. After about two,
maybe three, years, both series converge again. The phenomenon of people
1More information about how we constructed the index of perceived inﬂation is given in
the appendix. See also the discussion in the next section.
3misperceiving actual inﬂation rates was observed in all twelve euro countries;
Germany diﬀered only insofar as the gap between actual and perceived inﬂation
closed sooner than in many other countries so that the eﬀect we describe here
could even be larger in other countries.
The gap between actual and perceived inﬂation is well documented in the
literature, and several explanations have been suggested for this phenomenon.2
Most explanations are based on the idea that consumers are in some respect
“non-rational”. While many of these “behavioural” arguments seem plausible,
they give the impression that inﬂation misperceptions are a sort of “unavoidable
side-eﬀect” of a currency changeover. Rather than being something unavoidable,
we will argue that inﬂation misperceptions were caused by policy mistakes.
A paper related to ours is Wunder, Schwarze, Krug and Herzog (2006),
who study the changeover’s impact on people’s satisfaction with their income.
The authors use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and
confront these with a comparable panel from Britain where the euro was not
introduced. Doing this enables controlling for factors other than the changeover
that might have had an eﬀect on people at the time such as the terrorist attacks
in September 2001. The authors ﬁnd that the changeover had a “clear negative
impact on ﬁnancial satisfaction”. A compensation for this loss would require an
increase in household income of around thirty percent. Wunder et al. do not
consider actual changes in behaviour, but it seems unlikely that an impact as
large as that estimated would not aﬀect people’s consumption decisions.
In the next section we will present the data, the estimation procedure and
the results. Policy implications will be discussed in section 3 and a summary
concludes the paper.
2 Estimation
We estimate the impact of people’s misperceptions on revenue in the restaurant
sector by a standard OLS regression. The dependent variable is real annual
revenue growth in the German restaurant sector measured as
xt−xt−12
xt−12 × 100
where xt is the level of real revenue in period t. The data are monthly and the
2See, for example, Del Giovanne and Sabbatini (2005); Aucremanne, Collin and Stragier
(2006); European Commission (2005); European Central Bank (2005); Fluch and Stix (2005).
4sample includes the 26 years from January 1981 until December 2006. Test-
ing for stationarity, we cannot reject the hypothesis that revenue growth is
stationary. By computing growth as a year-on-year change we get rid of the
pronounced seasonality of the original data. Restaurants sell signiﬁcantly more
in the summer and around Christmas. The eﬀect of the changeover is captured
by a dummy variable (“changeover”) that takes the value 1 in the 24 months
after the changeover (January 2002 until December 2003) and zero otherwise.
The estimation results are shown in table 1.3
The model explains about 61 percent of the variation in annual growth (ad-
justed R-squared = 0.611). The residuals seem normally distributed and no
autocorrelation appears.4
Dependent Variable: revenue  (%_y)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1982:01 2006:12
Included observations: 300 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
constant -1,28 0,47 -2,74 0,01
changeover -5,07 0,56 -9,00 0,00
trend -0,01 0,00 -5,11 0,00
gdp (%_y) 0,34 0,09 3,78 0,00
consumer confidence (∆) -0,07 0,01 -4,78 0,00
unemployment rate (%_y) -0,07 0,01 -5,39 0,00
interest rate spread (∆)(-3) 1,11 0,47 2,34 0,02
temperature 0,29 0,09 3,11 0,00
temperature (∆) 0,15 0,07 2,09 0,04
restaurant prices  (%_m) 0,00 0,00 1,09 0,27
revenue (-1)  (%_y) 0,21 0,05 4,21 0,00
revenue (-12)  (%_y) -0,34 0,04 -8,23 0,00
R-squared 0,625     Mean dependent var -2,34
Adjusted R-squared 0,611     S.D. dependent var 3,19
S.E. of regression 1,986     Akaike info criterion 4,25
Sum squared resid 1136,30     Schwarz criterion 4,40
Log likelihood -625,44     F-statistic 43,72
Durbin-Watson stat 2,06     Prob(F-statistic) 0,00
Table 1: Regression Output
3The abbreviations in the table are:
• ∆ (ﬁrst diﬀerence),









4The actual and the ﬁtted data over the whole sample period are shown in the appendix
together with the residuals.
5The regression constant is negative indicating that this sector is declining
over the sample period. Revenue growth appears to have a small but signiﬁcant
negative trend over the sample period. Note that the restaurant series does
not include company canteens, an industry that increased over the last decades.
The point estimate on the changeover dummy is −5.07, that is, annual growth
in the restaurant sector in the 24 months after the changeover is more than 5
percentage points below of what can be explained by the other variables in the
model. Or else, using our interpretation, annual growth in the restaurant sector
would have been 5 percentage points higher in 2002 and 2003 if the changeover
had not taken place.
Restaurant revenue growth is slightly pro-cyclical; an increase in real GDP
growth of 1 percent increases restaurant revenue by about a third of a percent-
age point. An increase in consumer conﬁdence appears to decrease restaurant
output. Consumer conﬁdence is a good indicator for consumption spending on
durable goods and it might be that the more people spend on such items, the
less time and money they have to eat out. The estimates of the other vari-
ables have the expected sign. An increase in the growth of the unemployment
rate decreases revenue growth. We add the three-month-lagged yield spread
between ten-year government bonds and the three-month money market rate.
A steepening of the yield curve can be interpreted as agents’ expectations of an
improvement in future general economic conditions.
The variable “temperature” measures deviations from the long run monthly
average temperature in Germany. The estimates show that people spend more
eating out during relatively warm weather. Interestingly, also the ﬁrst diﬀerence
in temperature aﬀects consumption. All else equal, people spend more eating
out in a relatively warm month that follows a relatively cold one. Here it appears
as if people have a certain budget (of time or money) they would like to spend
in restaurants and if their plans are cut short by bad weather, rather than
cancelling, they tend to postpone eating out until the weather gets nicer.
In Germany, restaurant prices increased somewhat with the changeover and
we have to be careful that the decline in revenue we describe was not caused by
these price changes. Adding inﬂation in restaurant prices on the right hand side
does not help to predict revenue growth (t-statistic = 0.27). This is the result
6we expected mainly because price increases happened in the sample at other
times as well without any noticeable eﬀect on revenue. Dropping the variable
restaurant prices leaves the point estimate on the changeover dummy unaﬀected.






100, unlike revenue growth, for example, which is measured as a year-on-year
change. This is eventually an assumption about consumers’ behaviour; about
whether consumers compare current prices with last month’s prices or with last
year’s prices. We have opted for the ﬁrst assumption because it seemed more
plausible but the results do not change much under the alternative assumption.
We also included revenue growth lagged one period and lagged twelve periods.
Both variables are signiﬁcant.
The point estimate on the changeover dummy can be used to estimate the
absolute losses the German restaurant sector incurred in the months following
the changeover. The average revenue during the whole sample excluding 2002
and 2003, the two years in which the dummy takes the value 1, is 21.28 billion
euros. The sector thus incurred losses of more than 2 billion euros (21.28×2×
0.0499 = 2.1). With around 90 000 restaurants in Germany, the losses amount
to more than 20 000 euros per restaurant.5
A diﬀerent way to estimate the eﬀect of people’s inﬂation misperceptions is
to include them as an explanatory variable in the model. Doing this (the re-
gression output is shown in the appendix) shows that misperceptions are highly
signiﬁcant and the explanatory power of the model increases somewhat. We
have, however, decided to use the model with the dummy variable as the cen-
tral one of this paper. This for the following reason.
Inﬂation misperceptions are the diﬀerence between actual and perceived in-
ﬂation. While data on actual inﬂation are readily available, perceived inﬂation
needs to be constructed from survey data. A possible choice is the survey con-
ducted by the European Commission and is the one we use here. The “perceived
inﬂation” index calculated from the survey data is a balance statistic and is the
diﬀerence between the percentage of respondents stating that prices have in-
creased and the percentage of respondents stating that prices have decreased.6
The perceived inﬂation index is, therefore, not directly comparable to the actual
5Since the dummy covers two entire years we ignored the seasonality in this calculation.
6The exact question asked, the possible answers and their respective weights in the balance
statistic are shown in the appendix.
7inﬂation rate and needs to be quantiﬁed which is usually done by matching the
ﬁrst and second moments of both series for the time span for which a stable
relationship between both series is assumed to exist (for a discussion on this
procedure see Aucremanne et al. 2007). The resulting series was shown in
ﬁgure 2. The reason why we have chosen not to continue with this model is
that we felt uncomfortable to include a variable (misperceptions) on the right
hand side which - by construction - is a function of the changeover and to use
this variable to predict the eﬀect of the changeover itself. The dummy variable
approach avoids this circularity.
We conclude this section with a short discussion about causality. The dummy
variable in the regression captures unusual changes in revenue growth in the
two years after the changeover and we interpret the negative impact as caused
by people’s inﬂation misperceptions. There is, however, the possibility that
the decline is revenue is unrelated to the changeover and that the estimates
are spurious. In principle, it is not possible to establish causality, there are,
however, strong signs that suggest that the changeover triggered the decline.
The model tracks revenue growth quite well over a period of more than 25
years, but would largely overestimate revenue growth in 2002 and 2003 had we
not introduced the changeover dummy. During our sample period, Germany
experienced three recessions (1982, 1993 and 2002), and as we have seen above,
the restaurant industry is procyclical and declines during economic downturns
but the contraction we observed in 2002 is considerably larger than what can be
expected from normal business cycle movements. A look at yearly data conﬁrms
this impression. Yearly data for the restaurant industry are available from 1963
onward. The contraction of −8.1 percent we observed in 2002 is by far the
largest in the last 46 years. The second largest decrease occurred in 2003 with
−4.6 percent. Another sign suggesting a causal relationship between the decline
in revenue and people’s misperceptions is the timing of the decline. This point
is resumed in the next section.
3 Discussion and Policy Implications
From a historical perspective, the contraction suﬀered by the German restaurant
sector in 2002 and 2003 is remarkably strong. Noteworthy is also that the main
part of the contraction occurred only several months after the changeover. This
matches the pattern of the public outcry which - judging by press reports - was
8relatively contained in the months immediately following the changeover and
only started to intensify in summer 2002. The ECB (2002) reports that at the
beginning of 2002, some negative stories appeared in the media but that “the
tone overall was very positive”. Isengaard and Schneider (2006) term the press
coverage at the time “extremely positive” and argue that only few complaints
about rising prices appeared. The swing in public opinion and in the press
occurred about ﬁve months after the changeover. For a discussion of possible
reasons for this pattern see Eife and Coombs (2007).
In order to understand what drives the contraction in the restaurant sector,
it seems useful to distinguish between two eﬀects of people’s misperceptions.
The ﬁrst eﬀect is that the discussion in the media and in the public about
whether or not ﬁrms tried to proﬁt from the changeover appears to have confused
consumers and might have encouraged them to cut back on consumption and
“punish” retailers for their “excessive pricing”. The consumer strike organised
in Germany in July 2002, seven months after the changeover, illustrates this
behaviour.
The second eﬀect is that the changeover and the discussion about prices
appear to have had a profound negative impact on consumer conﬁdence and
on people’s perceptions of their own ﬁnancial situation. An interesting study is
Wunder, Schwarze, Krug and Herzog (2006) that we already mentioned in the
introduction. The authors use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to estimate the impact
of the changeover on people’s satisfaction with their income. Using a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach, Wunder et al. estimate a common model for Germany
and Great Britain in which the introduction of the euro is considered a treatment
eﬀect. The British population serves as the control group. The authors argue
that the new currency caused a “clear negative impact on ﬁnancial satisfaction”.
A compensation for this loss in ﬁnancial satisfaction would require an increase
in household income of around thirty percent. Wunder et al. do not estimate
actual changes in behaviour, but it seems unlikely that an impact as large as
that estimated would not aﬀect people’s consumption decisions.
People’s inﬂation misperceptions are not restricted to the restaurant sector
in particular and the question that arises here is whether the misperceptions
had macroeconomic consequences as well. By focusing on only one sector, our
estimates do not answer this question but the results are suggestive. The public
9outcry about excessive pricing concerned nearly all goods and services and even
more important is the changeover’s impact on people’s perceptions of their ﬁ-
nancial situation. It seems possible that the recession in 2002 was at least partly
changeover-related though more research in this direction seems warranted.
An important issue here is whether people’s misperceptions could have been
avoided. There are a number of papers that address the question why people
have the impression that the changeover had such a strong impact on prices
while the actual impact was relatively small.7 As we mentioned already in the
introduction, nearly all explanation are based on the assumption that people are
in some form non-rational; that they have diﬃculties to remember old prices or
that they remember price increases more than price decreases. It is argued, for
example, that consumers more powerfully perceive price changes for goods they
buy more frequently than for goods they buy less frequently. The tendency of
retailers to price at pricing points (such as 1.99 or 24.90) forces them to round
up or down when converting prices and if half of the prices go up and the other
half down, it is argued, people would have the impression of a rising price level.
Many of these explanations seem plausible and we understand that it is
sometimes useful to explain certain phenomena in economics with non-rational
behaviour, but most papers on this subject give the impression that the mis-
perceptions are something policy makers cannot do much about. Rather than
some unavoidable side-eﬀect of a currency changeover, the misperceptions seem
to be caused by policy mistakes.
The 2002 changeover oﬀers a number of policy mistakes that contributed to
people’s misperceptions. In order to illustrate the point we want to make here,
we will discuss a few of the more severe mistakes. For a detailed analysis see
Coombs and Eife (2007) and Eife and Coombs (2007).
The inﬂation misperceptions we observed after the changeover are a sign
that people did not consider the authorities’ statements about actual inﬂation
rates credible and the question we have to ask is what caused this distrust in
the oﬃcial data. A possible explanation is the inconsistency of the authorities’
responses to complaints about rising prices. The ECB’s position, for example,
7Cestari, Del Giovane and Rossi-Arnaud (2007) and Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2005) give
a good overview.
10seems to have changed from that there was “no evidence” for an impact in Feb-
ruary 2002 to that there “appears to be some impact” in July 2002. Correcting
previous statements gives the impression of being unprepared and confused and
might explain why people turned away from the oﬃcial reports to the media
to get information about what really happened to prices. This was a drawback
because media reports on the subject were often unbalanced and sometimes
based on small and biased data samples. Given the size and the quality of
their data bases, the publications by the statistical oﬃces remained surprisingly
unnoticed in the public discussion and in the press and here too, the lack of
credibility seems part of the explanation. Statistical oﬃces need to take care
that their publications are considered credible. Failing to do so seems more a
policy problem and should not be blamed on the non-rationality of the people.
The impact of a currency changeover on people’s lives is easily underesti-
mated. The changing of coins and banknotes and in particular the changing
of all nominal prices provides diﬃculties, especially for the elderly. Fears that
such an event would bring disadvantages are likely and some complaints about
rising prices, right or wrong, are probably inevitable. The outcry we observed
in 2002, the consumer strikes, and the confusion about what really happened to
prices seem, however, unnecessary.
4 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to study whether inﬂation misperceptions may have
real eﬀects, that is, whether they induce people to alter their behaviour. In-
ﬂation misperceptions were observed in Europe after the euro changeover in
January 2002 when people considerably overestimated actual inﬂation rates for
a period of several years. Looking at the German restaurant sector, we found
that inﬂation misperceptions caused people to alter their behaviour. The con-
traction this sector observed was too pronounced to be explained by normal
business cycle movements.
In this study we restricted ourselves to the German restaurant industry
mainly because of data availability. The outcry about rising prices and the
misperceptions can, however, be found in the whole euro-zone so that the real
eﬀects we describe are probably not a speciﬁc German phenomenon. Here, more
research seems necessary.
11We also discussed the question how far the euro changeover and the ensu-
ing discussion about price stability contributed to the recession that followed
the changeover. Focusing on only one sector, the paper does not answer the
question but the results are suggestive. People’s inﬂation misperceptions are
not restricted to the restaurant sector in particular and even more important
is the changeover’s negative impact on people’s perceptions of their ﬁnancial
situation. It seems, therefore, possible that the recession in 2002 was at least
partly changeover-related though, here too, more research is warranted.
Finally, we discussed policy implications of the ﬁndings and took the posi-
tion that both the misperceptions and the resulting real eﬀects could have been
avoided with a better policy. The confusion in the public about the changeover’s
impact on prices and on inﬂation appears to a large extent caused by an incon-
sistent and confusing oﬃcial communication. What was missing were clear and
credible statements from the authorities about what really happened to prices.
Some complaints about rising prices are probably inevitable, but the outcry we
observed in 2002, the confusion about prices and eventually the real eﬀects seem
avoidable in future changeovers.
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13A Appendix
A.1 Regression with Misperceptions
Dependent Variable: revenue  (%∆)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1986:01 2006:12
Included observations: 252 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
constant -2,34 0,62 -3,78 0,000
gap (misperceptions) -1,16 0,16 -7,27 0,000
trend 0,00 0,00 -0,20 0,839
gdp (%∆) 0,30 0,10 3,06 0,002
consumer confidence (∆) -0,07 0,02 -3,95 0,000
unemployment rate (%∆) -0,10 0,02 -5,50 0,000
interest rate spread (∆) 1,54 0,51 3,01 0,003
temperature 0,26 0,10 2,61 0,010
d(temperature) 0,18 0,08 2,41 0,017
restaurant prices  (%∆ mom) 0,00 0,00 -0,07 0,941
revenue (-1)  (%∆) 0,24 0,06 4,28 0,000
revenue (-12)  (%∆) -0,27 0,05 -6,03 0,000
R-squared 0,650     Mean dependent var -2,33
Adjusted R-squared 0,634     S.D. dependent var 3,29
S.E. of regression 1,99     Akaike info criterion 4,26
Sum squared resid 950,74     Schwarz criterion 4,43
Log likelihood -524,88     F-statistic 40,51
Durbin-Watson stat 2,05     Prob(F-statistic) 0,00
Table 2: Regression Output
Table 2 shows the regression with misperceptions (“gap”) as an explaining
variable. This variable replaced the changeover dummy, all other variables are
the same as in table 1. Appendix A2 describes how we estimated people’s
misperceptions.
A.2 Estimating the gap between actual and perceived in-
ﬂation
Inﬂation misperceptions are the diﬀerence between actual and perceived inﬂa-
tion. In this section we will ﬁrst show how the perceived inﬂation series is
constructed from survey data and then transform this series to make it compa-
rable to actual inﬂation data.
Inﬂation perceptions are estimated from the Consumer Conﬁdence Barom-
eter Survey of the European Commission. The speciﬁc question is: “How do
14you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months?” Six
possible answers are given:
• A(1) “risen a lot”,
• A(2) “risen moderately”,
• A(3) “risen slightly”,
• A(4) “stayed about the same”,
• A(5) “fallen”,
• A(6) “do not know”.
These survey results are summarized as the balance statistic Bit , calculated
as the diﬀerence between the fraction of respondents stating that prices have
risen and the fraction of consumers stating that prices have fallen or stayed about
the same. The third and the sixth options are not used in the calculations. The
fractions are weighted with the weights of the diﬀerent answers are given as:
Bit = Ait (1) + 0.5Ait (2) + 0.5Ait (4) + Ait (5)
In order to make this measure comparable to actual inﬂation rate, we trans-




Bt −   B
￿
sB
sπ +   π
where πP
t is the quantiﬁed measure of perceived inﬂation at time t.   B and sB
stand for the mean and the standard deviation of the original balance statistic
Bt and   π and sπ are the corresponding statistics of oﬃcially measured inﬂation
πt (here CPI inﬂation). These means and standard deviations are computed
over the sample period for which it is thought that a stable relation between
measured and perceived inﬂation exists. In our case, this is the period from
1985:01 until 2001:12. For a discussion of this transformation see Aucremanne,
Collin, Stragier (2007).8 Note that by transforming perceived inﬂation we do
not take into account that this statistic is bounded from below and from above.
8An alternative way to quantify the balance statistic would be to regress the balance
statistic on a constant and actual inﬂation as proposed by Ehrmann (2006).
15A.3 Variables that appear in the Regressions
All variables are available over the entire sample period. The following abbre-
viations are used
• ∆ = xt − xt−1, ﬁrst diﬀerence
• %_m =
xt−xt−1
xt−1 , month on month percentage change
• %_y =
xt−xt−12
xt−12 , year on year percentage change
1. revenue (%_y)
Revenue growth in German restaurant sector, calculated as
xt−xt−12
xt−12 ×100
where xt is level of revenue in period t. Indexed data, monthly, current
prices, not seasonally adjusted. West Germany until 1991.
Source: Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Lange Reihen.
2. gdp (%_y)
Annual growth in German Gross Domestic Product calculated as
xt−xt−12
xt−12 ×
100 where xt is level of GDP in period t. Indexed, current prices, quarterly
data transformed into monthly by linear interpolation. West Germany un-
til 1991.
Source: Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
3. consumer conﬁdence (∆)
1st diﬀerence in Consumer conﬁdence indicator calculated as xt − xt−1
where xt is the arithmetic average of the balances (in percentage points)
of the answers to the questions on the ﬁnancial situation of households,
the general economic situation, unemployment expectations (with inverted
sign) and savings, all over the next 12 months. Balances are seasonally
adjusted.
Source: Datastream: BDCNFCONQ (Datastream — European Commis-
sion); European Commission consumer conﬁdence index for Germany, dif-
fusion index, +/- balance, , monthly.
4. unemployment rate (%_y)
Yearly growth rate of German unemployment rate, monthly data, Pan-
Germany from September 1990, not seasonally adjusted.
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit
165. interest rate spread (∆)
1st diﬀerence between German 10 year benchmark bond yield and 3 months
middle rate, monthly, not seasonally adjusted.
Source: Datastream. BDBRYLD (10 year benchmark bond yield Ger-
many) - GERMDRQ (GERMANY MONEY 3 MONTH - MIDDLE RATE).
6. temperature
Deviations from monthly average in degree centigrade, calculated as arith-
metic mean of observations in Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich,
monthly data, not seasonally adjusted.
Source: Deutscher Wetterdienst
7. temperature (∆)
1st diﬀerence of temperature.
8. gap (misperceptions)
Diﬀerence between actual inﬂation and a measure of perceived inﬂation
as calculated in the appendix.
9. restaurant prices (%_m)
Month-on-month inﬂation in restaurant prices.
Source: Federal statistical oﬃce.
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